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APPELLANTS BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal from an order granting respondents
partial summary judgment holding as a matter of law respondent
was a covered merit system employee.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Judge of the Third
Judicial District Court, held that as a matter of law plaintiffrespondent, a court reporter, was a covered merit system employee
and granted a partial summary judgment.

The court further ordere

that damages be resolved at later proceedings.

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek the reversal and vacating of the lower
courts order and that the case be remanded to the lower court
with the directive that the respondent was not a merit employee
and not subject to the merit system.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent was employed as a court reporter by the State
of Utah.

For several years she worked for Judge Merrill C. Faux

and was Judge Faux's reporter when he retired December 31, 1972.
Respondent remained employed during January 1973 as Judge Faux
was asked to sit during that month.
Judge D. Frank Wilkins, Court administrator, notified
respondent in writing that as of February 1st, 1973, she would be
terminated because there were no positions for court reporters
open in the District Court.
Respondent requested a merit system council hearing on her
termination on January 30, 1973. This request was denied by the
merit system council since court reporters had not been certified
to participate in the Merit System.
This action was then commenced.

2

:

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT COURT
REPORTERS ARE MERIT EMPLOYEES BECAUSE OF
SPECIFIC STATUTORY LANGUAGE TO THE CONTRARY.
Court reporters of the entire Judicial System of the State
of Utah —

Supreme Court, District Courts, and Juvenile Courts

—

have been specifically placed beyond and outside the scope and
meaning of the Merit System as enacted and amended.

Because of

this specificity, the lower court erred in holding otherwise.
Utah Code Annotated 67-13-6 is a crucial and controlling
statute relative to those positions, individuals or agencies
exempted from merit system status.

In particular, Section 6 (a)

(4) exempts the following:
11

....those employees whose regular duties
include public advocacy and defense of
administration policy; and those in a personal and confidential relationship to
elected officials and to heads of departments
agencies and other major offices...."
(emphasis added)
Referring to the above statutory language, clerks and
reporters of the court, whether it be the Supreme Court or
District Court have personal and confidential relationships with
the judges for whom they work.. This perhaps is better shown by
legislative mandate in Utah Code Annotated 78-56-1.1 where is
found:

3

"The court administrator shall appoint a
certified shorthand reporter with the approval of the district judge to report the
proceedings in each division of the district
courts. The certified shorthand reporters
shall hold office during the pleasure of the
court administrator, and the district judge."
(emphasis added.)
The legislature here acknowledges that the relationships
between the court and reporters are of such a personal nature,
that not only must there be compatability, but the Court must
have control over its own business and personnel. Otherwise,
the Judicial System no longer becomes one of independence under
the Utah constitution, but one controlled by the legislature
telling the courts who they may and may not hire and/or dismiss
thus prohibiting the courts to function as is required by law.
Some ambiguity exists relative to Utah Code Annotated
67-13-S(g) where referrance is made to "employees of the judiciary
who are not exempt by the provisions of this section" as being
covered by the merit system.

This state of confusion dissipates

when it is seen that the deletion of the former paragraph (a)(8)

/

was not a legislative mandate that all personnel of the judiciary, '
Supreme Court and otherwise, are included under the merit system.
No one would argue that the District judges are covered by
the merit system.

They are elected officials serving under the

specific exemptions of Utah Code Annotated 67-13-6 (a) (1) and (2).

4

None-the-less, subparagraph (4) as previously quoted specifically
exempts those in a "personal and confidential relationship to
elected officials" from coverage of the merit program.
What could be more personal and confidential than a court
reporter assigned to be the reporter for a certain Judge. The
reporter is not "the" reporter for "the courtroom", for if the
Judge changes courtrooms, the courtreporter changes with him to
the new location.

The reporter is the reporter of the judge, not

the State's reporter, and under Utah Code Annotated 78-56-1.1 as
previously quoted, the Judge has control over the dismissal of
his reporter.

Further it sould be pointed out that many situations

take place in front of the court reporter, but in chambers, because
of the sensitive nature of the matters involved, the judge can
request certain portions of transcript to be presented to him by
the reporter without either party aware.

Because of this relation-

ship, it becomes imperative to permit the broad discretion of the
Judge to control the stiuation before him.

Nothing could con-

stitute a more confidential or personal relationship as required
by subparagraph (a)(4).
Colorado has had similar experiences as Utah in the "Civil
Service" form of government, even though Utah's system is relatively new.

Colorado's Constitution, Article XII, Section 13,

paragraph (3) makes it possible if deemed advantageous for
Judicial Officers and employees to become a part of the Civil
Service or Merit System.

It states:

"Officers and employees within the
judicial department, other than judges
and justices, may be included within the
personnel system of the state upon determination by the suprerre court, sitting en
banc, that such would be in the best
interests of the state.11

Vi^-

The above provision was interpreted by the Colorado Supreme
Court in Inre Interrogatory of Governor, 162 Colo. 188, 475 P.2d
31 (1967) in responding to an inquiry of interpretation as permitted by the Colorado Constitution.

The pertinent language of

the court is as follows:
"Our opinion is that the foregoing
interrogatory should be answered in the
negative. In other words, it is our
view that employees of courts of record
of the State of Colorado and the positions they occupy, as authorized by
statute, are not subject to the Civil
Service provisions of Articel XII,
section 13 of the Constitution of
Colorado.
At the outset, it should be noted that
the issue posed by the interrogatory is
not whether employees of courts of record should be under a merit system, as
opposed to the so-called spoils system.
Rather, the more precise issue is
whether such employees should be brought
under a merit system which is in turn
under the control of the State Civil
Service Commission.

6

It is our considered view that the construction and interpretation given Article
XII, section 13 of the Constitution of
Colorado by all three branches of our state
government has consistently been that the
aforementioned provision in our Constitution does not apply to, or in any manner
encompass, employees of courts of record.
And this interpretation by the several
branches of state government has not only
been both contemporaneous and long standing in nature, but squares with the separation of powers doctrine. Let us first examine the judicial interpretation heretofore given this particular section of the
Constitution."
Thus we find our neighbor state recognizing the problems
posed in the case at bar.

U.C.A. 67-13-6 (a) (4), however speci-

fically permits the "personal and confidential11 status to be
exempt.

Because of the permissible posture of the Constitution,

Colorado established by voice of the court the finding as spelled
out in Utah Law.

The mere fact that language specifically nam-

ing judicial employees as exemptjwas deleted does not carte
blanche prove that judicial court reporters are under the merit
system.

U.C.A. 67-13-6 (a) (4) argues strongly against that

position.
In further supporting this position, it must be observed
that there is no clear and unequivocal declaration of legislative
intent that 78-56-1.1 is repealed or done away by the implementation of the 1971 amendment to the merit act. ^Thi^jCode section
specifically provides that the Judge may dismiss the court reporter without question^because the reporter serves at the pleasure
7

or whim of the Judge, and therefore prevails over the less
specific and ambiguous provision of the 1971 amendment.
In re Utah Savings and Loan Association 21 Utah 2d 169,
442 P.2d 929 (1968) clarifies this issue.

There the Utah

Supreme Court said:
"It is true here, as it is in so many
areas of the law, that one statute has
been enacted at one time with a particular
purpose in mind, and that another has been
enacted at another time with a different
purpose in mind. When this has been done
and there is an apparent conflict, it is
not proper to put all the emphasis to one
statute, as though it stated all of the
law on the subject to the exclusion of the
other. They should be looked at together,
in their relationship to each other, with
a view to reconciling any such apparent
conflict and giving each its intended
effect insofar as that can be accomplished
without nulifying the other.11
The Court further cited an early Utah case, University of
of Utah v. Richards 20 Utah 457, 59 p. 96 (1899) which says:
"One act is not to be allowed to defea't
another, if by reasonable construction the
two can be made to stand together."
These holdings of the above cases come parallel to the
present matter and as previously stated dismiss the confusion
as to which statute prevails.

U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 was enacted in

1969 to protect the integrity of the Judicial System.

This

statute protected the confidential nature of judicial matters.
The 1971 Amendment to the merit act was of a wholly
different nature.

It was not enacted for the specific purpose

8

of increasing and protecting the integrity of the Judicial System
but was a part of a general bill-aimed at increasi.n^Jthe. scope
of the merit coverage.

The conflict therefore arises by two

wholly unrelated matters having been enacted, one a specific
statute, the other a general statute.

Thus, the decision of

In re Utah Savings and Loan Association, supra, must control.
The court said it is "not proper to put all emphasis to one
statute /U.C.A. 67-13-6(gV/, as though it stated all the law on
the subject to the exclusion of the other /u.C.A. 78-56-1.17" k *^

" Jr
(brackets added).

Looking at them together to give each its

/

intended affect without nullifying the other is what must be done.
U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 permits the Judge specifically to dismiss
reporters—to take them off the payroll.
tained is therefore clear.

The effect to be main-

Does U.C.A. 67-13-6 permit this

statute to maintain its identity?, Yes! Section

6(a)(4) permits

those positions of a relationship to elected officials /Jtfdgejs7
to be exempt from the merit act in spite of subsection

6 (g) .

Thus, U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 has maintained its identy and force.
Does U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 permit U.C.A. 67-13-6 to maintain its
identity and purpose? Yes! This latter statute is a general
statute enacted by the legislature to expand the strength of the
merit system.

Subsection (g) of that subsection specifically

defers its position to employees who are not "exempt by the
9

provisions of this section..."

As has been shown, the specific

statute, U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 controls and maintains its identity
and therefore becomes the exception spoken of under subsection
(g) .

Thus, the Suprene Courtis decision to reconcile and allow

each to maintain its identity has been accomplished and the
Judges are allowed to hire and dismiss court reporters as desired—the reporters, therefore, are not under the merit law.
Some question could arise, however, that the statute later
in time prevails-even over a specific statute.

Appellants feel

this position has no strength in the present matter.

Pacific

Intermountain Express v. State Tax Commission 7 Utah 2d 15, 316
P.2d 549 (1957) presents to the reader both general rules relative to the above position, but as stated in Bateman v. Board
of Examiners of the State of Utah 7 Utah 2d 221, 322 P.2d 381
(1958):
"Generally speaking we do not disagree
with this rule, nor with the reasoning upon
which it is based. But like all general
rules it must be applied with discernment as
to whether it fits the fact situation at
hand and no rule should be given force in
application where the facts plainly negative
any such intent."
In 1966 this court reaffirmed that position in Howe v.
Jackson 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159(1966) that both statutes
must be considered in light of their background and purpose in
deciding how to rule.

The exact language of the court is as

follows:
10

"Therefore, when such problems arise
a statute should be considered in the
light of its background and purpose;
and also in connection with other aspects
of the law which have a bearing on the
problem, in order that its intent and
purpose be fulfilled."
The background and purposes have been clearly set forth.
And what is the intent of U.C.A. 78-56-1.1? It is to allow judges
of all state courts, not just the district courts, to control
their staff and reporters in fulfillment of their constitutional
duties under Article VIII of the Utah Constitution.

Such cannot

be done if the court judges do not have the discretion of releasing from employment those individuals not found to meet with
the approval of the judges of the court.
It is therefore seen that (1) court reporters are specifically exempted from merit by virtue of U.C.A. 67-13-6 (a) (4) and
that U.C.A. 78-56-1.1 as a specific an unrepealed statute, allows
dismissal of court reporters which is in full harmony with the
provisions of the merit bill.
II
THE LOWER COURT FURTHER ERRED IN ITS RULING IF
COURT REPORTERS ARE COVERED, BECUASE THE RESPONDENT WAS NOT CERTIFIED AT THE TIME OF
DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE.
If the Supreme Court fails to accept appellantfs first
agrument regarding the exemption of court reporters under the
merit act, the fact still remains and is uncontroverted that the
respondent was not certified nor was she on probation as required

11

by the merit law.
As defined by Utah Code Annotated 67-13-6 (e): "The term
•Merit System1 shall refer to positions under schedules B and C."
What are those schedules?

U.C.A. 67-13-6 (b) (2 and 3) says as

follows:
"Schedule B - The competive schedule,
consisting of all positions filled through
competitive examination, written or unwritten and to which tenure shall apply
following a probationary period, subject
to the availability of funds and continued
need for the position.
Schedule C - The noncompetitive schedule,
consisting of all positions for which it is
not feasible to administer competitive examinations at entry. Following satisfactory
completion of at least a one year probationary
period, employees under this schedule shall
receive tenure."
Under either schedule B or C, before an employee may receive
what is termed "tenure," a probationary period must be undertaken
and completed by the employee in question.
i.e. merit status, can be gained.

Then certification,

Therefore, under the above

the respondent cannot claim that prior service gave her tenure in
position when the merit system went into effect.
statutes above provide exactly the opposite.

In fact, the

Utah Code Annotated

67-13-7 (a) specifically sets forth the requirements of certification for those employed when the act went into effect before
merit status is given.

That Section states:

12

"All employees, officers and other
personnel not other wise exempt by law,
who prior to the effective date of this
act have served continuously for a period
of one year or more, and either who have
been certified under existing merit system
rules and regulations or who are certified
in writing ninety days after the effect
date of this act by the appointing officer
under whom they serve to be serving satisfactorily, shall be deemed to have tenure
under the merit system..." (Emphasis Added)
Based on the preceeding language, it is seen that provision
was made for employees in respondent's situation - those who had
been serving in their capacity for one year prior to the effective
date of the act.

However, U.C.A. 67-13-7 (a) spells out specific

procedures necessary for persons such as respondent in order to
take advantage of coverage.

Those procedures are (1). The

employee must be certified under the existing rules and regulations
and (2). said certification is established by the appointing
officer certifying in writing within 90 days that the employee is
serving satisfactorily.

In the case at bar none of the procedures

was followed or even attempted.

It is therefore difficult for

appellant to comprehend now the lower court held that the respondent was on merit as a "matter of law1.1 Everything points to
the contrary conclusion that as a "matter of law" the employee
was not under the merit system because none of the required procedures was followed or even attempted.
If U.C.A. 67-13-7 (a) had been utilized within 90 days as
there required, tenure would be given - not requiring a probation

13

period, for those state employees covered by the act.

Since it

is the States contention that court reporters do not fall under
the scope of the act, these arguments tend to be academic at
the most.

Nevertheless if certification, as required by the

statute had not been completed in time, then any employee covered
by the act would have to look to schedules B and C to see how
tenure could be achieved.
a probationary period.

Those schedules specifically call for

The Oregon Supreme Court reiterated the

widely held position regarding the status of probationary employeesin Schlieting v. Bergstrom 13 Or. App. 562, 511 P.2d 846 (1973).
The court said:
"We conclude that the better approach
is for courts to not review whether the
hiring or firing of a probationary public
employe is "arbitrary. ,f Except for the
substantive constitutional limitations
discussed elsewhere, a public employer
can base personnel dicisions concerning
probationary employees on any reason or
no reason. In short, personnel decisions
concerning public employees are within
the unfettered discretion of their employers."
Therefore, in keeping with above position, even if the
respondent had been on probation, her dismissal would have been
proper.
The merrit system regulations further point out the soundness of this position and the fallibility of the lower court's
ruling.

Article VII, Section 5, paragraph 1 of the merit system

and personnel regulations dated December 1, 1973 (still in effect)
14

says as follows:
"All employees, officers and other
personnel not otherwise exempted by law,
who prior to May 11, 1965, or prior to
the date their agency or their position
comes under Merit System coverage and
who have not been certified under the
previously existing Merit System may be
discharged; or if they are certified in
writing by the administrative officer
to be serving satisfactorily on the
effective date of such coverage shall
have status as:
a. Probationary employees in the class
of position in which they are serving
until they have completed a satisfactory
one-year probationary period from the
date of original appointment. Nothing
herein contained shall preclude positions
held by any incumbent from being reclassified or reallocated or preclude the establishment of additional classes or the division,
combination, alteration or abolition of existing classes, pursuant to this act and
appropriate regulations.11
Further, paragraph 3 of the same makes provision for new
agencies or positions coming under the merit act after the act
goes into effect.

Thus, if this court finds that the 1971 amend-

ment places court reporters under merit coverage, this paragraph
must also control to determine to whom and when merit status
attaches.

It reads as follows:

"When a position within a covered agency
is brought under the Merit System subsequent
• to the date the agency came under Merit
System coverage, the incumbent, in order to
be eligible for continued employment in such
position, shall on the effective date of such
coverage meet the requirements in Paragraph 1
and 2 of this section in the same manner as
if his agency were being brought under the
Merit System on such date."
15

Certainly, if this court held that court reporters fall
under the merit system, they would be controlled by the language
"brought under the Merit System" subsequent to the effective date
of the Act, and would therefore dictate that procedures be follow
ed for certification which were not in the case at bar.
Paragraph 2 states:
"Persons with one year or more of service •;
who are not certified in Paragraph 1 above
as serving satisfactorily on the date of
such coverage may:
a.

Be separated; or

b.
Be placed on probation for a six-month
period commencing with the effective date of
such Merit System coverage, with the rights
of probationary employees; or
c.
Be given provisional status pending the
establishment of an adequate register for
their respective positions."
Here, it is clearly seen from the regulations that (1)
certification is a must,

(2) the procedures must be followed

and not by-passed, (3) probation is necessary if the employee
was not covered when the act went into effect and (4) certain
sanctions are spelled out when there is non-compliance.

None

of the above has been complied with in the present matter except
the dismissal provision.

This court must not allow such a

flagrant violation of merit procedures to stand as presented by
the respondent.

To do so, would in effect nullify the entire

procedures of merit law and

set a bad precident.
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Not only the above cited regulations permit discharge for
non compliance and/or during the probationary period, but Utah
Code Annotated 67-13-7 (b) and (c) likewise permit such action:
"(b) Persons with one year or more of
service, not so certified may (1) be separated; or (2) be placed on probation for a
six-month period commencing with the effective date of this act with the rights of
probationary employees; or (3) be given
provisional status pending the establishment of an adequate register for their
respective positions.
(c) An employee who has had less than
one year of service on the effective date
of this act may be discharged; but if retained, shall be required to satisfactorily
complete a probationary period of one year
from the date of his appointment in order
to be retained in state service."
Thus once again certification is requisite to merit status,
for if one is "not so certified" he may be "separated," from that
position and merit status totally or "placed on probation."

The

respondent was separated and dismissed in this matter as permitted
above.
In essence, the laws and regulations state that until one
is certified and until one follows the procedures of the merit
system—even over extended periods-—one is not a merit employee.
The respondent's situation here as to certification is very
similar to that of an Assistant Attorney General.

Under the

Attorney General Career Service Act 67-5-6 et. seq. an attorney
may be placed in career service status six months after he is recommended for career status by the Attorney General.
17
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If the

Attorney General doesn't make recommendation, the attorney is
not placed in career service status.

The status is not con-

ferred automatically, the Attorney General must specifically
recommend such status and upon this certification merit status
is bestowed.
It is therefore clear upon this closer analysis of the
laws involved, that even if court reporters fall under a nonexempt status, the respondent failed to comply with the laws
and regulations and cannot be considered as "amatter of law"
to have been "on merit."
CONCLUSION
It has been shown that court reporters do not fall under
merit system because of their relationship with the Judicial
system and that even if they did, the laws and regulations were
not followed to give the respondent merit status.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted to this court that
the decision of the lower court be reversed and remanded for
further action in compliance with its opinion.
Respectfully,

VERNON B. ROMNEY,
Attorney General
Frank V. Nelson
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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